Suchergebnisse

Bei dem vorliegenden Text handelt es sich um einen Vortrag des Autors im Rahmen des SCHIFF-Kolloquiums "Kooperation und Konflikt in der Ostseeregion". Der Autor ist seit 1995 als Vertreter des Außenministeriums der Russischen Föderation im Gebiet Kaliningrad tätig und skizziert in seinem Vortrag seine persönlichen Eindrücke und Erfahrungen im Kaliningrader Gebiet, das er als die "Oblast einer Stadt" bezeichnet. Er beschreibt den regionalen "acquis communautaire" und diskutiert die Chancen und Gefahren der Osterweiterung der EU für Kaliningrad. Um zu verdeutlichen, dass die Kaliningrader Bevölkerung die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zu ihren Nachbarn befürwortet, stellt er ferner einige Ergebnisse von Umfragen aus den Jahren 1996 und 2000 vor. (ICI)

The authors of the article analyse how the policy of the Russian Federation towards Kaliningrad Oblast could influence main national interests of the Lithuanian Republic - the integration into the EU and NATO. Thus two main problems are discussed in the article: first, how Russia seeks to use the problem of military transit to/from Kaliningrad Oblast.

The authors of the article analyse how the policy of the Russian Federation towards Kaliningrad Oblast could influence main national interests of the Lithuanian Republic - the integration into the EU and NATO. Thus two main problems are discussed in the article: first, how Russia seeks to use the problem of military transit to/from Kaliningrad Oblast.

The authors of the article analyse how the policy of the Russian Federation towards Kaliningrad Oblast could influence main national interests of the Lithuanian Republic - the integration into the EU and NATO. Thus two main problems are discussed in the article: first, how Russia seeks to use the problem of military transit to/from Kaliningrad Oblast.

The authors of the article analyse how the policy of the Russian Federation towards Kaliningrad Oblast could influence main national interests of the Lithuanian Republic - the integration into the EU and NATO. Thus two main problems are discussed in the article: first, how Russia seeks to use the problem of military transit to/from Kaliningrad Oblast.

<i>From the geopolitical point of view, the Kaliningrad Oblast, due to its exclave location, has
become an area of strategic importance. Its strategic nature has been steadily increasing
with the successive enlargements of the European Union and NATO. The geographical
location and the army stationed in the area allow Moscow to control the situation in
the Baltic Sea basin. This makes it possible, through the Euro-Atlantic location of most
countries in the region, to influence European policies. In this way, Russia is playing
a leading role in this part of the continent. From the point of view of the countries within the
region, it is a global military power and a regional superpower. In this context, Kaliningrad
exclave increasingly more frequently serves as a security policy tool. It is part of the ongoing
threat to the Baltic States and Poland. Demilitarisation of the region, which is periodically
demanded by neighbouring countries, is impossible for several reasons. The armed forces
stationed there are a counterbalance to the expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
from Russia's point of view. They serve to protect national interests and secure the affairs
of the Russian and Russian-speaking diasporas in the immediate vicinity. They protect the
Russian economic zone and access to the resources of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the military
potential located in the Kaliningrad Oblast, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been
a guarantee of continuity of Potsdam's border solutions.</i>

This article addresses the role that the legacy of the pre- and post-WWII past has played in ongoing identity debates among the inhabitants of Kaliningrad oblast of the Russian Federation. Since 1991, interest in preserving this legacy has been on the rise, influencing the inhabitants' feeling of regional distinctiveness in numerous ways. While the pre-war legacy is important for a considerable number of Kaliningraders, others believe that it threatens the Russian and Soviet mien of the Oblast, both in cultural and political terms. They favor taking greater care of Soviet-era buildings, monuments, and other commemorations of war heroes. This viewpoint disparity has recently widened due to both internal and external factors, including the deterioration of Russo-western relations. A March 2015 incident in the village of Veselovka is used to reflect upon the way in which pre-war and post-war legacies are used in the above-mentioned identity debate. The author examines the direction of identity construction in the oblast through the officially-acknowledged vision of Russianness as pursued by President Vladimir Putin, in particular, and the Russian government, in general.

Contributing empirical evidence in a rather neglected research field, this article examines the emergence of a regional identity in the Russian Kaliningrad oblast since Soviet times by analysing the composition and the views of the population, official symbols, place names, architecture, history-writing as well as economic and political strivings. It is concluded that the region has developed from a militarized, closed anonymous part of the Soviet Russian empire into an exclave separated from Russia, still Russian by nationality but more open and Western than the country at large. The inhabitants are coming to terms with the region's German past and realize that they have specific political and economic interests. This emerging regional identity has so far been compatible with a wider Russian identity. But if the economic situation in the region continues to worsen in comparison with the surrounding states, and the federal centre in Moscow cannot support the region, calls for more autonomy and even separatism may grow.

The former Soviet military bastion, Russia's westernmost region, the Kaliningrad Oblast, has again re-gained its military strength. The process of re-militarization that was initiated after 2009, resulted in transformation of the area into Russia's Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) zone. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis (started in the late 2013) and growing alienation between Moscow and its Western partners, the oblast has stepped onto a qualitatively new level of militarization. At the same time, following changing nature of warfare, aside from military-related steps, the Russian side has heavily invested in non-military aspects as well. The analysis yields three policy implications. First, Russia's understanding of the A2/AD concept is different from the Western reading, and Kaliningrad exemplifies this supposition. Second, Russia will continue using Kaliningrad as a part of its growing reliance on asymmetricity. Third, underestimation of Russia's resolve and/or Kaliningrad capabilities will have largely negative conclusions for the Baltic Sea region and countries that comprise it.

Abstract
The article analyses the notion of national and regional identity of contemporary inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast, as seen by local government officials, NGO activists and researchers living and working in the Polish cities of Elbląg and Gdańsk. For the purposes of the article, nine in-depth interviews were chosen conducted. The article takes into account interviewees' opinions based on their experience, everyday cooperation with institutions and private contacts with individuals from Kaliningrad Oblast. The main question addressed is to what extent inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast are perceived to be different from their compatriots from other regions of Russia in matters constituting national community: narrative of history, tradition, symbols etc. The role of the Local Small Border Traffic Agreement (LBTA) between Poland and Russia, which has served as an important means of facilitating cross-border contacts, was also evaluated. The article demonstrates that despite come regional peculiarities the most prevailing level of identity in Kaliningrad Oblast is that related to the feeling of belonging to the Russian nation.